Hugh Hewitt posted an entry at his blog about the Democrats’ plans to use Robert’s “deeply held beliefs” as an objection to his confirmation. As Hugh points out, this is, at its essence, a religious test. Judge Roberts is a practising Catholic.
As Hugh points out, Chuck Schumer has gone on the offensive regarding
this issue in the past:
The New Yorker argued that the conservative religious views of Holmes, a devout Catholic, disqualified him because of disagreements interpreting the separation of church and state. Schumer contended that ‘religious beliefs cannot dictate government policy, even though they can infuse our values.’
This is a clear demonstration of the fact-value split written about by Nancy Pearcey in her award winning book,
Total Truth: Liberating Christianity From Its Cultural Captivity. Inherent in the advocacy of fact-value split is the position that those with a Christian Worldview should have no seat at the table when it comes to policy making.
What is disheartening is to see the statements of Judge Roberts’ friends and fellow Christians showing that they buy into this as legitimate. They, in their anticipation of such an attack on him, say such things as:
‘They are devout Catholics,’ said the Rev. Michael C. McFarland, the college president. ‘They are not the kind of people who would be in your face,’ he added. Their religion ‘would affect their personal lives, but they are very professional in their work.’
Shannen W. Coffin, a friend of Judge Roberts and a former Justice Department lawyer, said: ‘John’s faith is his faith, and his approach to the law is a separate issue. If it has any effect, it is in the sense of restraint, that he is not and the role of the judge is not to be the center of the universe. It stems from the sort of humility of a faithful person.’
This an argument which says that the Christian worldview is a mere emotion (faith)—rather than a moral framework which should inform the Christian’s entire life and work. Thus, the question must be asked—if one is precluded from using Christian philosophy (or natural law) as a guide—what philosophy is acceptable? Existentialism, rampant utilitarianism? Clearly, as Nancy wrote in Total Truth, Christians’ bear some responsibility in allowing the fact-value split argument to go unchallenged.
Unfortunately, the philosophy that has informed most judges today is pragmatism as advocated by Holmes—and later Posner. And—that brings me to the question as to whether or not, simply being conservative should be sufficient reason for social conservatives to support the confirmation of a nominee.
You will note that, above, I mention Holmes and Posner. Both are considered men of the right. However, as Nancy Pearcey makes clear in her article, Why Judges Make the Law:The Roots and Remedy of Judicial Imperialism, that is not sufficient. If you read her article, you may not be so comforted with the limited knowledge that Roberts is conservative. You might want to know what kind of conservative he is. For example take Holmes as discussed in Nancy Pearcey’s article:
Legal pragmatism traces its origins to the early decades of the 20th Century when America was wrestling with the implications of Darwin’s theory of evolution. Holmes was one of a group of scholars whose goal was to work out the implications of Darwinism for an overarching philosophy of life, which came to be called pragmatism.
—-snip—-
For Holmes the law should be established “upon accurately measured social desires instead of tradition.” In his highly influential 1897 essay “The Path of the Law,” Holmes even reduced law to a summary of the social and economic policies shown scientifically to work best. As he put it, “The man of the future is the man of statistics and the master of economics.” Law was redefined as a tool for identifying and manipulating factors aimed at creating social harmony and progress.
In short, law was little more than a tool for social engineering, using the coercive power of the state to enforce the policies deemed by bureaucrats to be most desirable. To quote Holmes again, the justification for a law is not that it is consistent with universal principles but “that it helps bring out a social end which we desire.”
And Posner? Again, according to Nancy Pearcey:
It is no surprise to learn that Posner terms his position “pragmatic moral skepticism,” nor that his hero is Holmes, whom he has called “the American Nietzsche.” Thus the influence of Holmes’s legal pragmatism lives on, with its instrumentalist view of the law as a tool of social policy.
The chief theoretical failing of pragmatism is that its only measure for evaluating law is whether it “works”—whether it achieves desired social goals: It offers no transcendent principles by which to say whether those goals themselves are good or bad. Indeed, Posner defines the heart of legal pragmatism as “a rejection of a concept of law as grounded in permanent principles . . . and a determination to use law as an instrument for social ends.” Yet how do we know whether particular social ends are morally right or wrong?
Nancy Pearcey underlines the corrosive nature of pragmatism when she writes:
Worse, since pragmatism treats law as an instrument for getting whatever we want, it offers no protection against the powerful using it to achieve whatever they want. In a personal letter, Holmes once wrote these chilling words: “[W]hen it comes to the development of a corpus juris the ultimate question is what do the dominant forces of the community want and do they want it hard enough to disregard whatever inhibitions may stand in the way.”
These are not the ideas of social conservatives—though, again, Holmes and Posner are considered men of the right. These ideas certainly conflict with Natural Law and the duty of Christians to always consider the dignity of the human person.
Where does Roberts stand on this? Slate writes that as a law student, Roberts wrote regarding the following:
In an article written as a law student, argued that the phrase “just compensation” in the Fifth Amendment, which limits the government in the taking of private property, should be “informed by changing norms of justice.” This sounds like a nod to liberal constitutional theory, but Roberts’ alternative interpretation was more protective of property interests than Supreme Court law at the time. (emphasis mine)
This emphasized section seems consistent with the Darwinist-inspired pragmatism of Holmes and Posner and the idea that there are no absolutes.
Should we be concerned? Well, Roberts was a law student at the time. It is possible that his views have evolved.
And, as Thomas C. Grey wrote in Judicial Review and Legal Pragmatism, law students have long been taught pragmatism rather than natural law theory:
Langdell and his followers were fervent in their belief that public law could not be legal
science. They insisted, for example, that law students at Harvard and at other schools purporting to follow its example not be exposed to public law subjects until their third year, so that they would not be distracted from their inculcation in proper legal scientific methods by exposure to mere legislation. At the same time, their rigorous positivism made them deny natural law force to the common law principles they derived from the case law. Langdell insisted, for example, that there was nothing “natural” (or moral, or convenient) about the common law doctrine of consideration in contract – the civil law had no such doctrine, and perhaps was the better for it. But this did notdetract from the “fundamental” character of consideration as a requirement of the common law of contract. Being “fundamental” in the legal-scientific sense did not mean that a principle was required by justice or sound policy. (emphasis added)
It is notable that Langdell did regard legislation as “supreme over case law”—but he repudiated natural law, unlike the Lochner line of cases (also discussed in Grey’s article—this is a very worthwhile article to read in total) :
By contrast, the Lochner line of cases had clear natural law overtones. As the Court put it in 1898, the due process clauses protected “principles” like liberty of contract because they were“fundamental” in the sense that they represented “immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of free government.”
What is Roberts theory of law is a more specific question than, is he a conservative. As Krauthammer points out, we do not know what his theory of law is. As Paul at Power Line says:
In sum: Is Roberts a conservative? Yes, surely. Does he hold a single theory of law that is conservative? Maybe. Would it be better if we knew that he held such a theory? Yes. If it turns out that he doesn’t, does that mean he will not be a reliable conservative Justice over the long haul. Not necessarily, and in Roberts’ case probably not.
I would say,
perhaps not. I am not particularly concerned that Roberts would be a Souter. I see no evidence that he would be anything like Souter.
I am very concerned that he might be another Holmes or Posner.
This is precisely why I agree with Nancy Pearcey that we should insist that the Christian Worldview and Natural law have a place at the table. We are in a bigger fight than one to appoint conservatives to the bench.
We are also in a fight between the forces of pragmatism and rampant utilitarianism as represented by the “conservative”, Posner, and the theory of Natural Law and rights as bestowed by our Creator and that I wrote about when reviewing Alberto Piedra’s book, Restoring the Dignity of the Human Person: A Review of Natural Law, The Foundation of an Orderly Economic System . The review is posted here.
If you don’t believe that there is such a fight, go read Pejmanesque here and here about why Justice Thomas was savaged by Reid and Kevin Drum when it was thought that he might be a Natural Law adherent.
Richard Reeb at the Claremont Institute makes some of the same points much more eloquently.
At the very least, I’d like to know where Roberts stands on the ideas of Holmes. In the meantime, I do think that it is important that we defeat the left’s position that “deeply held beliefs” disqualify him from being a Supreme Court Justice.
Submitted to Carnival of the Trackbacks XXI. Welcome to Wizbang readers!
Update:
This certainly does not give me any comfort. From Human Events Online:
Sen. John Cornyn (R.-Tex.), who serves on the committee, is an outspoken critic of last month’s Kelo v. New London decision, in which the court ruled that the 5th Amendment’s “takings” clause does not prevent government from seizing people’s homes to give to private developers. He should pay special attention to Roberts’ role in the case of Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency. Here, as a private attorney, Roberts represented a government agency against property owners. His job, as he put it in a written answer to the committee in 2003, was “to argue before the Supreme Court that the agency’s moratorium on development to preserve the pristine character of Lake Tahoe did not constitute a taking of property.”
He won 6 to 3. But the dissenters were Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas. (emphasis added)