This story makes sick to my stomach…
Back in the 1960’s, the F.B.I. withheld evidence from state authorities which would have exonerated four men of a gangland slaying. The men spent DECADES in prison.


This story makes sick to my stomach…
Back in the 1960’s, the F.B.I. withheld evidence from state authorities which would have exonerated four men of a gangland slaying. The men spent DECADES in prison.
The Death House case happened under Johnny Sutton’s watch. The case involved the alleged mishandling of an informant who participated in the murder of several people and the near abduction of a DEA agent and his family in Juarez. In the latter instance, there was a failure to share information with the DEA, which caused the chief of the El Paso DEA’s office to write a blistering letter to his counterpart in I.C.E.:
Michael Hunter, a former state trooper who actually knows what it is like to be a law enforcement officer, and has investigated shootings committed by fellow officers wrote a great post here about policy versus reality and tradition. It is his position that officers often, with the tacit permission of supervisors, follow tradition over non-critical policy. Who can blame them when they are crushed under the weight of policies often created in knee jerk fashion as Michael points out:
Another problem with policy is that once you have it, you have it whether you really want it, or whether you like it and even if it isn’t needed. Lots of policy is written because some officer somewhere did something once that resulted in a one-time problem that someone never wants to see again, so we get another policy. One thing police leaders need to consider is that in today’s courts, judges seem to take policy very seriously, even if officers don’t.
If the prosecution knew this, yet chose to use the following of “tradition” over policy by Ramos and Compean to tar them in the jury’s eyes, I believe this is totally unfair. This is the sort of thing that should be tempered by prosecutorial discretion. The prosecutor is there to do justice, not to win. A prosecutor must possess a high level of integrity to overcome the desire to use such evidence in a way that misprepresents the defendant in an unfair manner. Do Kanof and Sutton possess this degree of integrity?
(Administrator’s comment: Michael is a former state trooper who has investigated shootings by law enforcement officers)
There was an argument during pre-trial about allowing evidence of Border Patrol agents firing their weapons without making reports. They have a policy that requires them to notify a supervisor within one hour that they have fired the weapon whether on purpose or by accident and for any reason. The Court did not want to go into a lengthy exploration of officers firing their weapons. The prosecutor surely did not want the jury to see that others fired their weapons without reporting it and without getting into trouble.
The trouble with policy is that it does not always match reality, tradition, supervisory expectations and it is not always well-understood. Training can overcome lack of knowledge, make inroads into tradition, change the attitude and expectations of supervisors, and makes it better understood. Unfortunately, policy is not usually written in the field, but in a sterile atmosphere by well-meaning people who draw upon collective experience (and personal) and sometimes on the advice of attorneys (no offense intended). Policies change too, and officers have roll call or Read & Sign, but a lot gets lost in the translation when officers are thinking about what they are going to be doing during their shift as Sarge covers that point.
Another problem with policy is that once you have it, you have it whether you really want it, or whether you like it and even if it isn’t needed. Lots of policy is written because some officer somewhere did something once that resulted in a one-time problem that someone never wants to see again, so we get another policy. One thing police leaders need to consider is that in today’s courts, judges seem to take policy very seriously, even if officers don’t.
Tradition and attitude are hard to break. If traditionally every officer assigned somewhere meets at 11:45 am for lunch at The Corner, and if supervisors look the other way or join in – regardless of the policy that says officers are not to congregate – you are likely to find several official cars parked within a half block of The Corner around noon on a given day unless there is something going on. Whoa then to the new supervisor who comes in and tries to alter the tradition. The police manager who tries to do so will affect morale and have to deal with the problems he causes as long as he is there. I call it “knowing the code”. Small agencies have fewer problems, but a large decentralized agency has to live with bad rules. Local offices essentially rewrite a few policies (but not on paper) as long as they are trivial. Tradition sometimes goes away as times change and as new blood comes in, but not always.
Critical policy cannot be the same way. These are the policies that get people in trouble or hurt. Search and seizure, laws of arrest, pursuit policy, use of force are all among the critical policies. When local tradition is outside critical policy, you have a real problem. You can bet every critical policy has been reviewed by attorneys (and will be known by many defense attorneys). Critical policy must have field input as well. Critical policy must be reviewed frequently and understood by everyone.
In this case the prosecution wanted to show a “pattern” of the officers acting outside policy and ignoring the rules. If you get in trouble for being one of four congregating at The Corner, and you drive off the road and hit a mailbox (unsafe driving) and you use the F-word and get a complaint while handling an unruly crowd, when you violate policy and get taken to task for it in a court, you have “shown a pattern” of breaking the rules. This is presented to the jury as evidence that you are a bad actor and deserve to be convicted of what you have been accused of. What it is actually is evidence that you are a human being reacting to stresses, situations, and social ambiguity.
Also in this case the prosecutor did NOT want to show a “pattern” that Border Patrol officers discharge their firearms with some regularity without reporting it – and did not want to show that they do not get into trouble for it. I do not know the history well here, but you can bet the agents did.
Let’s look at it. The Border Patrol was formed years ago when policies and procedures were much more limited than they are today. Policy may have been limited, but tradition was building. Tradition was born of seat-of-the-pants work that comprised much of policing at one time and still plays a significant part of it today. Local policing and Border Patrol traditions were also based on local traditions. If locals, say, shot rattlesnakes on sight, it is likely that the local agents did so as well. I doubt anyone reported it either. I doubt that Border Patrol agents in Maine shot rattlesnakes, nor did the people in the ivory tower in Washington or at the training academy (if there was one back then). Policy however, was not written in El Paso. Guess where.
Policy about reporting discharge of firearms makes sense in a lot of ways. Officers are supposed to be in control of their weapons and ammunition. If they accidentally touch one off, training may be needed. Warning shots are pretty much taboo. Carelessness may call for discipline. If there is a discharge while holstering a second weapon, there may be a defective holster. Ammunition is expensive, and you account for it. Shooting it out with people usually generates enough excitement that everyone knows about it soon after it happens and notification goes without saying.
Is there a need to report the euthanizing of a crippled deer? Is it allowable to kill a snake? Do you report rounds fired at the range in practice?
The question is whether there is an unwritten tradition of firing shots at animals of some sort for practice and/or to rid the landscape of some of them (rats, snakes, rabbits, deer, stray dogs). If the agents do it, and if the supervisors do it, or if the supervisors turn a blind eye, then the policy is only being selectively enforced. If agents are used to firing in some circumstances without reporting it, and if supervisors know about it or do it as well, it has become a de facto policy (locally). If supervisors have been turning a blind eye while it is happening to maintain deniability, then the policy is a fraud, and they are enabling the violation dishonestly. It is a tradition that everyone knows is against the rules.
Special Agent Chris Sanchez came in from outside to investigate this. Chris Sanchez is not a Border Patrol agent and has never been one. He is from Homeland Security, Office of the Inspector General. I’ll bet that when he calls people, their blood runs cold. He does not know the local traditions, and he does not care. He is investigating employee misconduct. Violations of these rules are misconduct. A tradition that is against policy is not going to be talked about by the rank and file. No one else wants to be investigated. Supervisors who turned a blind eye will say that when an agent fires a weapon, the agent must report it within one hour. They can point to training that has been documented.
That’s the trouble with outsiders investigating inside. They don’t know the code. They have no empathy. It is all cut and dried. A policy was written for a purpose (not that the reason matters) and the policy has been violated. Agent violated the rules, case closed. Now with respect to SA Chris Sanchez, he has been well-trained and is expected to do a tough job. There is a lot more than an unreported shooting, so at this time I am not really going to get on his case.
It is the Prosecutor’s case I am on. If there is a pattern of officers shooting without reporting it, if guys start doing things out of habit, if supervisors were at the scene, it is understood there was a shooting. The supervisors did not report it and it was their call. Any discipline for not reporting the shooting should have been on them. Discipline starts at the top. Failure to report a shooting should not have been used to show a pattern of misconduct by the officer when there was a pattern that the agents did it normally when they felt that it didn’t count. Unfortunately it counted here.
Michael Hunter is a former State Trooper who has investigated shootings involving law enforcement. He has commented on this blog here and here.
He has graciously accepted my invitation to blog about the Ramos Compean case as he is also going through the transcripts. I believe that his experience will add a dimension that not even the really good attorneys and others commenting at Patterico can possibly contribute. We are lawyers looking at words on the page to see if the prosecution made a case. Michael has been out in the field and can add context to the words.
I look forward to his input.
I found a great piece by Kay B. Day on Gilmer’s case. She discusses the legal aspects of this case.
U. S. Attorney Johnny Sutton, appointed in October, 2001, by President George W. Bush, selected Assistant U.S. Attorney Bill Baumann to prosecute the case. He told the media law enforcement officers cannot use deadly force to stop a vehicle unless it poses an “imminent threat” to the officer or another person. Noting the vehicle was going away from Hernandez (and omitting the fact it had tried to run the deputy over seconds before fleeing), Baumann said this wasn’t “even a close call.”The problem with Baumann’s narrow reasoning falls on the words “another person.” Does a vehicle full of people breaking the law, with a driver who attempts to injure a policeman, represent a broader threat to society? Is a law enforcement officer bound to protect the people he serves? If you try to harm a policeman, does it follow you might try to harm anyone else who gets in your way?
Here is the Texas Penal Code on the use of force by law enforcement to arrests (though I know this prosecuted under Federal law):
§ 9.51. ARREST AND SEARCH. (a) A peace officer, or a
person acting in a peace officer’s presence and at his direction, is
justified in using force against another when and to the degree the
actor reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to
make or assist in making an arrest or search, or to prevent or
assist in preventing escape after arrest, if:(1) the actor reasonably believes the arrest or search
is lawful or, if the arrest or search is made under a warrant, he
reasonably believes the warrant is valid; and(2) before using force, the actor manifests his purpose to arrest or search and identifies himself as a peace officer or as one acting at a peace officer’s direction, unless he
reasonably believes his purpose and identity are already known by
or cannot reasonably be made known to the person to be arrested.(b) A person other than a peace officer (or one acting at his
direction) is justified in using force against another when and to
the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is immediately
necessary to make or assist in making a lawful arrest, or to prevent
or assist in preventing escape after lawful arrest if, before using
force, the actor manifests his purpose to and the reason for the
arrest or reasonably believes his purpose and the reason are
already known by or cannot reasonably be made known to the person to
be arrested.(c) A peace officer is justified in using deadly force
against another when and to the degree the peace officer reasonably
believes the deadly force is immediately necessary to make an
arrest, or to prevent escape after arrest, if the use of force would
have been justified under Subsection (a) and:(1) the actor reasonably believes the conduct for which arrest is authorized included the use or attempted use of
deadly force; or(2) the actor reasonably believes there is a substantial risk that the person to be arrested will cause death or serious bodily injury to the actor or another if the arrest is
delayed.Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974.
Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, § 1.01, eff. Sept. 1,
1994.
Look at this part again:
(c) A peace officer is justified in using deadly force
against another when and to the degree the peace officer reasonably
believes the deadly force is immediately necessary to make an
arrest, or to prevent escape after arrest, if the use of force would
have been justified under Subsection (a) and: (1) the actor reasonably believes the conduct for
which arrest is authorized included the use or attempted use of
deadly force;
I would say that trying to run over Gilmer Hernandez qualifies as the “use or attempted use of deadly force.” And, having a person who demonstrated the willingness to run somebody down out on the road certainly poses a substantial risk to others out on the road that night.
Go here to listen to it and here are the lyrics.
When I listen to it, I feel like I’m back in the 60’s.
Michael Hunter had some great commments about the Ramos Compean case here at this site. He has made another excellent comment at Patterico’s place. I am going to post it here because it gives us good insight into why Ramos and Compean may not have talked too much after the shoot and how OAD could have kept running after the shooting.
Gunshots do not necessarily hinder a man pumped on adrenaline from functioning unless nerves are severed, major bones broken (legs), vitals are struck or if there is major muscle damage. A hit in the buttocks that does damage to the urethra would not necessarily be painful (at the moment), although it is likely that he would feel it big time later. A number of our people (a highway patrol agancy) have been involved in shootings and were amazed by the ability of fatally injured assailants to continue to function and fight or run and a few others by their own ability, not even realizing they had been hit until moments later.As to talking among themselves after a shoot out, it is very likely that the involved were silent as it is a very emotionally draining experience. As the adrenaline wears off and the officers ratchet their emotions back down they will experience fatigue. Adrenaline is known to be toxic if not totally burned off. Studies of people involved in post stress trauma note that emotions can include anger that they were involved, anger at the assailant for forcing the issue, anger at partners for getting them into the situation or not preventing it, anger at themselves for not preventing the shooting, and probably in this case embarrassment and self-reproach for an inability to stop the assailant (OAD). They may also experience relief that they are not hurt and that they did not seriously hurt the assailant and trepidation at what the supervisors and administration were going to think and do. These are all “normal” emotions. If he felt threatened and other officers did not join in assisting him, he would be unhappy with them as well. (They would probably get the silent treatment for that.)
If Compean thought he was directly threatened as he maintains, the experience is very personal and overwhelming and there have been many recorded instances of officers believing that they were going to die – and accepting it rather than fighting back. In the 1980s when this became known, training was altered all over the US so that officers were taught not to give up even if they thought they were fatally injured (as they might be wrong) and fewer officers just laid down and died. The fact that he was not shot and no one found a weapon does not alter this. It is likely that the two officers just checked to see if each other was okay or possibly a quick thanks from Compean to Ramos for being there for him.
Part of post stress trauma has to do with the way people are brought up, although not all people (including officers) experience it. Officer believe they are the good guys. If they have been brought up in the church, there is a commandment “Thou Shalt Not Kill”, which can be a conflict with officers (me included). Being in a situation where he has taken a life, seriously injured someone or used deadly force imposes a sudden conflict. Guys susceptible to this fool themselves until the moment after this happens. I always said that in that situation, it was the other guy’s choice, but after a man I was pursuing nearly killed himself, I was essentially a basket case – unable to properly function at the scene in my job. Only when I found he was not hurt badly was I able to come down from that – and not immediately either. After a shooting, many agencies require a visit to mental health professionals, including ours. One friend of mine in another agency (Don Roberts, Toledo, Ohio) committed suicide after a righteous fatal shooting in which he probably saved his partner’s life.
Compean may have also doubted himself after the incident. If he thought initially that there was a weapon (which would mean to him that he was about to be shot), he was justified in defending himself and knew it. Later when he had not been shot at, he may have wondered if he saw what he thought he saw or if he had been “seeing things”, in other words, he may have thought he made a mistake. That alone could bring dread to him – and a lot of quiet.
Comment by Michael Hunter — 2/23/2007 @ 9:43 pm
Scroll down and read another exchange between Michael and other commenters at the site. The attorneys and others at Patterico’s are doing a great job of analyzing the transcripts—though I don’t agree with all of their conclusions at this point.
I’ve been skipping around the trial transcripts. I just re-read Ramos’s testimony and noticed something interesting in the cross examination by Kanof beginning on page 46. It has to do with perceptions. You will note that a good part of the governments approach was to discredit the testimony by Compean and Ramos that they thought OAD turned back and pointed a gun at them. They did this by eliciting testimony that, during other parts of the incident, Ramos and Compean and Juarez did not see a gun in OAD’s hand. As I’ve discussed in another post, Juarez was not in a position to see OAD during all points of the chase on the vega side of the levee. Also, much was made of the fact that OAD was right-handed, as if the agents were supposed to discern that at the time.
However, then it came to OAD, Kanof seems to excuse OAD’s misperceptions. OAD testified that he saw other agents besides Compean pointing guns at him when he was in the ditch. However, Ramos testified that, although he had unholstered his gun at that point, he was not pointing it at OAD, but rather was holding it in “ready pistol position”. Here is where it gets interesting:
Q. So when Osvalde testified that he turned around and he saw several agents pointing a gun, he must have been right, correct?A. I guess so.
Q. You were one of them?
A. I didn’t say that I was pointing my gun at him.
Q. Well, I thought you said that, when you get out—yesterday, in testimony, you said when you got out you drew your gun.
A. I drew my gun.
Q. Oh. You drew your gun, and you just left it by your side?
A. No, ma’am. I had it in a ready pistol position.
Q. Okay.
A. Just right here (indicating).
Q. So you’re standing at the edge. You have it in the ready pistol position, you’re watching the guy?
A. Yes, ma’am.
Q. Okay. Well, if Mr. Aldrete-Davila saw you like that, don’t you think he might have thought you were pointing your gun at him?
(emphasis added)
So, OAD’s misperceptions under the circumstances are understandable and excusable—but Ramos’s perception about the possible gun is not?
You know what I wish? I wish that Ramos had answered like this: “Yes, he might have thought that—just like I thought he pointed a gun at me.”
I posted about Gary Brugman here and here. I quoted the prosecutor who encountered Brugman during the trial and allegedly said:
“It’s not a matter of IF you’re going to prison, it’s a matter of how long you’re going to prison for. I have a $50,000,000 budget to make sure you’re going.”
Now NewsMax is covering the story.
Federal Prosecutors have great power. Unlike local D.A.’s, they are not elected and they cover vast areas of jurisdiction (at least here in Texas) We can vote local D.A.’s out of office if they abuse their office, fail to control their assistants or behave with arrogance. Their power is constrained by our vote.
Not so with Federal Prosecutors. Their power is awesome, and we all know the adage that “power corrupts”. U.S. Attorney General Robert H. Jackson wrote a speech about it and said this:
The qualities of a good prosecutor are as elusive and as impossible to define as those which mark a gentleman. And those who need to be told would not understand it anyway. A sensitiveness to fair play and sportsmanship is perhaps the best protection against the abuse of power, and the citizen’s safety lies in the prosecutor who tempers zeal with human kindness, who seeks truth and not victims, who serves the law and not factional purposes, and who approaches his task with humility.
There are some Federal prosecutors who adhere to this with great diligence. I have had the pleasure of dealing with one of those in my career. She chose not to indict my client because, though she knew that she could make a technical, civil violation iinto a criminal case under our present Medicaid/Medicare laws, she knew that my client had no mens rea.
There are some, whose focus is only to win—which is misguided according to AG Jackson:
Your positions are of such independence and importance that while you are being diligent, strict, and vigorous in law enforcement you can also afford to be just. Although the government technically loses its case, it has really won if justice has been done. The lawyer in public office is justified in seeking to leave behind him a good record. But he must remember that his most alert and severe, but just, judges will be the members of his own profession, and that lawyers rest their good opinion of each other not merely on results accomplished but on the quality of the performance. Reputation has been called “the shadow cast by one’s daily life.” Any prosecutor who risks his day-to-day professional name for fair dealing to build up statistics of success has a perverted sense of practical values, as well as defects of character.(emphasis added)
It appears to me that we have some Federal Prosecutors who care overmuch about statistics. This article about Debra Kanof raises suspicions in my mind about her focus. The story of Gary Brugman raises other questions about Sutton, Bauman and Bauman’s assistant and their focus.
Arrogance and condescension are disgusting traits and should be avoided by all lawyers. These traits are especially disturbing when found in Federal Prosecutors due to their great power. A Federal Prosecutor who can’t find it in himself to be courteous to those who disagree with him and choose to debate him have little business holding the lives of others in their hands.
I have noticed comments about Compean putting a new magazine in his gun during the incident. I wondered about that and asked Michael Hunter, a former State Trooper, who had this great comment a couple of days ago to explain what this meant. With his permission, I am posting his email here:
It is called a “tactical reload”. Some years after I joined, the Highway Patrol taught us this tactic as there is a lot of evidence that officers do not know how many shots they fire in dynamic situations. In fact they try to get us to mentally count as we fire on the range or in simulation, but they know that even as realistic as they try to make training, it is not the same as being under fire.A classmate (Tom G.) in 1975 or 6 was in a situation where he had already been badly injured with a man on top of him and was in serious danger of dying when he found his revolver and fired it against the chest of his assailant. They found 2 marks on the primer of the first cartidge in his 6-shot revolver. In other words he pulled the trigger 7 times and only quit when it did not fire again.
Later, with this training, Angela W. was shot in the chest by an assailant with a .44 magnum but survived thanks to her vest and instantly returned fire. She did a reload when she thought she ran out of ammo (13 rounds, if I remember correctly in a .40 cal Beretta) and was later found to have ejected a magazine with live rounds. She may have had a jam, but the point was she had no idea how many times she fired. For awhile we were trained to do a specific scenario where, after a number of rounds were fired, we did a tactical reload and retained the other magazine to use later if we totally ran out.
The thinking was that in a dynamic situation we would revert to training, and if we had a second round face-off with an armed assailant, we would be doing it with a fully loaded weapon. Whoa to the guy who counts the officer’s rounds and gets bold! They documented at least one shooting where an officer did this, but I no longer recall the circumstances or the results.
My impression of the situation, after receiving this background, is that the insertion of the new magazine is not indicative of wrongdoing—but an instinctive following of training. Is it possible that the prosecutor was wrongfully conflating an instinctive reaction grounded in training with a nefarious act? Perhaps Michael will comment further.
I also asked him how long it takes to get shots off. He replied:
It takes very little time to fire off 10 rounds. My weapon is a Sig Sauer P-226 .40 caliber semi-auto handgun. It is double action (never cocked, always the same trigger pressure, no safety). If I just shoot it, I can fire 10 times in about 4 seconds. If I am taking time to point and shoot, the time will go up, and if I am trying to get a sight alignment, the time will increase more due to recoil and having to realign.
Four seconds. What does that tell us about the sequence of events?
![]()
When God commanded that we put no other god before him, he did not confine this Commandment to the worship of statues. He was telling us that we should put nothing above Him and his law. We may not prostrate ourselves before the statutes of golden calves, but we routinely bow down to human institutions and place human laws above God’s laws.
It is my opinion that we elevate our system of justice to such a degree as to be idolatry. We ignore the fact that it is a human institution which has real human failings.
Therefore, as the blogosphere continues to discuss thetrial transcripts and convictions of Ramos and Compean, we find some saying such things as—“they were convicted by unanimous vote of the jury”—suggesting that the vote of a jury is sacrosanct and irrefutably the truth. We see others, especially lawyers, examining every misstep and conflict in testimony of Compean and Ramos as if failing to remember perfectly—or remembering differently from each other is proof of guilt—with no consideration of the high stress circumstances of the incident. Of course, if their stories matched perfectly, some would be calling that a “set up”.
We hold Ramos and Compean to a standard of near perfection, while excusing a system which condones bestowing “favors” on witnesses and coercing witnesses with threats of prosecution when their stories do not find favor with the prosecutor. We stand mute when the Federal leviathan swoops down and disregards the findings of the respected Texas Rangers in order to prosecute a Deputy for reasons more political than just. We watch in horror when a District Attorney cuts a “wide swath in the law” in order to prosecute innocent men for personal gain, committing the bearing of false witness, intimidation of witnesses and defying facts that were before his face.
We react with confusion as prosecutors transform civil or administrative infractions in to crimes. We realize that we have lost control when we observe prosecutors piling on charge after charge after charge for the same facts in order to enhance punishment for acts that have not hurt, killed or caused a loss of anything of value to any person or institution.
Whereas, at one time, those who bore false witness in judicial proceedings were condemned to the same sentence that would have been pronounced on their victims, we now find apologists for the liars. Those who wrongfully convict men by hiding exculpatory evidence continue in their professions—despite the fact that their withholding of exculpatory evidence would have resulted in a death had it not been detected. Judges allow testimony bought through the shameful practice of “jumping the bus”.
Our jurisprudence came from Blackstone’s Common Law—which expressly based itself on God’s law—transcendant law. It has now descended into the law of Jeremy Bentham, a man who believed in rounding up people before they committed crimes, in torture for extracting confessions and that defendant’s lawyers have the duty to aid the prosecution. With the rise of Benthamite influences, has come the decline of the principles embodied in the Rights of Englishmen—and the increase of wrongful prosecutions and convictions.
Blackstone’s Rights of the Englishmen preserved the personal nature of justice—law is a shield which protects the individual. With Bentham came collectivism—law is a sword to be wielded in the service of the greater good. There is nothing personal about it, it is “might makes right”, a steamroller, “a blind, impersonal, and mechanically operative force”. It encourages prosecutors to concentrate on notches in their belts rather than justice.
It is embodied in the following statement, allegedly made by an Assistant United States Attorney to Gary Brugman in an encounter when Brugman was without his lawyer:
“It’s not a matter of IF you’re going to prison, it’s a matter of how long you’re going to prison for. I have a $50,000,000 budget to make sure you’re going.”
(From American Freedom Riders)
I’m going to continue looking at the trial transcripts—but I am not going to rely only on legalistic analysis, I am going to find others who have knowledge about law enforcement and other areas who may be able to detect whether the government’s case was created from clever lawyer wordsmithing—or reality. You must consider that the government was advancing a particular worldview of how the Border Patrol was to operate. The goverment held all the cards in that particular endeavor—-because it controlled all the witnesses available to explain how things work. Is the paperwork insufficient—that’s indicative of a coverup. Is a BP agent supposed to capture dealers—or just push them back over the border?
I’m going to start with my next post.
If this story regarding the prosecution of Gary Brugman is true, something is very wrong. (HT FREE Border Patrol agent “Nacho” Ignacio Ramos ).
For instance, why was someone from the Mexican Consulate sitting at the prosecution table during the trial?
One point the prosecution in the Compean Ramos case made over and over again with various witnesses, is that Agent Richards, one of the supervisors who went to the scene, is a stickler about paperwork. Thus, he would not have blown off making a report about the assault on Compean or the discharge of the firearms. had he known about them.
However, I invite you all to go to this volume of the transcript to the cross-examination of Agent Richards by Stephen Peters, one of the attorneys for Ramos. Specifically look at the testimony beginning on page 244. Peters goes through the pursuit policy with Richards and establishes that the agents were in pursuit mode. It is clear that Richards knew about the pursuit as it was in progress. In fact, he went out to see what was happening when the radio was quiet for a while.
Then, an interesting line of questioning begins on page 253. There you will find an admission by Agent Richards that the supervisors of agents involved in a pursuit must file a report outlining the details of that pursuit. Agent Richards admits that he did not file such a report.
Q. And it’s also part of the policy that, whenever there is a pursuit, that the supervisor of the agents initiating a pursuit has to prepare a report outlining the details of the pursuit?A. That’s correct.
Q. Do you know whethter such a report was prepared in this case?
A. No, sir, there was not.
On page 254, he acknowledges that ultimate responsibility for the report fell on him.
Q. Who would have been responsible for filing a pursuit report if the supervisors had been notified of a pursuit?A. The agent and the supervisor.
Q. Okay. And who was the supervisor?
A. It would have been Robert Arnold or myself.
Q. Okay. So how would it—how would it be determined whether it was you or Robert Arnold who was responsible for filing that report?
A. I would have either assigned him the task or I would have done it myself.
Q. So, ultimately, it was your responsibility, or would have been your responsibility?
A. That’s correct, as well as the supervisor.
This certainly undercuts the prosecution’s theory that Richards would never encourage or condone shirking paperwork—even if it was at the end of a shift. It gives credence to Agents Compean and Ramos’s perceptions that Richards was discouraging the reporting of an assault on Compean by OAD. In my experience, employees often sense what their supervisors don’t want pushed and act accordingly. I got the impression that is what Compean was doing when he backed off on the assault issue.
Could it also explain the lack of clarity about why no formal report was filed regarding the discharge of Compean’s and Ramos’s weapons?
Jerome Corsi at WND is reporting another major development in the Ramos Compean case. It has now been confirmed that Aldrete-Davila was identified as being involved in another drug smuggling incident after the one that occured in February of 2005. As the story makes clear, the judge in the Ramos Compean case sealed the evidence and issued a gag order preventing the families and attorneys from discussing this.
This may be grounds for an appeal given the 5th Circuit’s decision in the Sipe case. In that case, the prosecution withheld evidence from the defense, as I discussed here, about an incident where the illegal who had been injured, Guevara, was caught—after the incident for which Sipe was indicted and before the trial—illegally transporting illegals. He was not detained or arrested. He was, in fact, released due to intervention by a Border Patrol Agent related to Guevara’s drug trafficking boss.
The trial court believed that this evidence, along with other evidence, was exculpatory because it reflected on the crediblity of the accuser, since he was a transporter and not the innocent mere illegal coming across to do lawn work, and it showed the extent of the benefits given by the government to the accused for his testimony. The 5th Circuit, in its decision, expressed concern for the the withholding of several pieces of evidence concerning the extent of the benefits given Guevara, apparently, including the “get out of jail free” pass given Guevara. This was especially compelling because Guevara kept changing his story as the benefits to him multiplied. Thus, the 5th circuit affirmed the trial court’s decision to grant Sipe a new trial.
This may or may not help Ramos and Compean on appeal. But, it is a very interesting parallel to the Sipes case.